Debt is not inherently negative in the realm of finance; rather, it can be a catalyst for growth, ideally benefiting all parties involved. However, in the case of Manchester United, it appears that only the banks and the Glazer family are reaping the rewards.
The leveraged buyout executed by the Glazers in 2005 burdened the club with a staggering £604 million in debt. There was optimism that the listing on the New York Stock Exchange in 2012 would alleviate some of this financial strain, but the impact was minimal.
In fact, the Glazers reportedly took home approximately half of the proceeds from the initial public offering in the United States. As of March 2025, the club’s gross debt has escalated to £731.5 million, which is £127 million higher than it was in 2005.
While the real value of the debt has decreased when adjusted for inflation, the Red Devils have incurred over £750 million in interest payments since the takeover, effectively negating any perceived benefits.
However, one might argue that United’s annual interest payment of around £30 million is manageable, especially in light of the club’s record revenues of £662 million for the 2023-24 season. This may seem trivial at first glance.
For a club in a healthier financial position, this might be the case. Take Tottenham, for instance; they generate less revenue than United yet pay a comparable amount in annual interest. The key difference is that, unlike Spurs, United lacks a revenue-generating stadium to justify such expenses.
Additionally, Tottenham is not experiencing significant cash flow issues. In terms of financial management, the two clubs have diverged considerably in recent seasons, despite their close standings in the Premier League.
Sir Jim Ratcliffe is making efforts to address the situation; however, his approach—characterized by significant staff reductions, the elimination of essential benefits, and cuts to charitable and community initiatives—has blurred the line between operational efficiency and harshness.
Ineos, which holds a 29 percent stake in Manchester United and has been granted operational control by the Glazers, has adopted a similarly aggressive strategy to enhance revenue for debt servicing.
The organization has raised ticket prices at Old Trafford and, reflecting a concerning trend within the English Premier League, is also reducing concession prices for children and seniors.
Additionally, the Premier League’s decision to maintain the Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) for at least another season implies that United’s interest payments will continue to impact Ruben Amorim’s financial resources.
Notably, UIF has learned that Crystal Palace was the only club to oppose the continuation of the PSR and the postponement of a UEFA-style squad cost regulation.
This opposition may have simply been a reaction to the prevailing circumstances during the recent Premier League shareholder meeting in London where the vote took place.
Regardless, Ineos faces significant challenges in managing United’s financial landscape alongside the complications they have inherited within the football operations.
As Kieran Maguire, a football finance lecturer at Liverpool University and industry expert, has articulated in an exclusive discussion with UIF, the situation may deteriorate further before any improvement is realized.
Man United’s debt costs set to soar ahead of 2027 cut-off, says Kieran Maguire
Of United’s £731.5m debt, the breakdown is as follows:
- Senior secured notes: £337.6m
- Secured term loan facility: £178.1m
- Revolving credit facilities: £210m
- Accrued interest: £5.7m
The senior secured notes (mostly bank loans) and the revolving credit facility (the club’s overdraft), reach maturity in 2027.
In layman’s terms, United either have to pay off the principal – £548m in total – in its entirety or refinance, AKA negotiate new terms with the lenders to spread the cost out over a new term length.
“With some of Man United’s current loans maturing in 2027, there is a concern,” warned Maguire.
“Global interest rates have increased since the loans were originally taken out, so there could be an additional interest burden.
The Manchester United Supporters Trust, or MUST, recently published analysis that forecasts that United’s interest payments could double after 2027.
“On a separate issue,” says Maguire, “the new stadium is in the process of being engineered and approved, then the club will have to borrow further from the market at a time of high interest.
Old Trafford expansion or rebuild: United’s debt salvation?
“It’s not a good time to borrow – and that is far from ideal for Man United,” explains Maguire.
“Certainly, United’s interest costs could rise substantially and quickly. There’s no doubt that the debt is the biggest problem facing the club, in my view.
“However, if they get additional revenue coming from the new stadium, you have to look at it on a net basis.”
“If you’re generating more money from the new Old Trafford project, you have to look at how much is coming in to see whether or not they will better off financially.”
According to a basic pro-rata assessment that considers United’s existing matchday revenue and stadium capacity, a stadium accommodating 100,000 spectators could yield approximately £183 million in annual ticket sales.
Nevertheless, the actual revenue is expected to be significantly greater, as there are intentions to emphasize the profitable corporate hospitality market, enhance in-stadium revenue, and leverage associated commercial advantages.
The majority of experts consulted by UIF believe that a figure of £250 million is a plausible estimate.
Ed Woodward wrong about United’s debt but set for job with Premier League billionaire
In the comprehensive evaluation of United’s decline over the past decade, numerous individuals can be held accountable.
In addition to the Glazers, a series of shortsighted managers, high-profile failures, and even a racehorse named the Rock of Gibraltar, many United supporters will identify Ed Woodward as the principal antagonist.
The former investment banker, who often donned a blazer, openly admitted to having a greater affinity for rugby than for football.
He prioritized immediate commercial gains over the club’s long-term financial stability.
During his tenure, which began in 2007—two years after he facilitated the Glazers’ leveraged buyout—United’s debt situation became increasingly troubling.
He famously asserted that winning trophies was not a prerequisite for generating revenue. At the time of his statement in 2013, this appeared to be accurate. However, by 2025, the limitations of his perspective are becoming evident.
While United continues to rank among the wealthiest clubs globally in terms of revenue, their commercial growth has stagnated, and more astute competitors are poised to overtake them.
Woodward’s narrow focus is also evident in the club’s debt management. In the summer of 2014, he remarked, “The interest on the debt is £20m or something. That is less than 5% of our revenue.”
However, combined with poor cost management and a lack of progress on the field, the debt has become a considerable burden on resources that could, and should, be allocated to revitalizing the team.
Despite his background at JPMorgan, John Textor, the largest individual shareholder at Crystal Palace, remains undeterred.
Textor has extended an offer to Woodward for a position as the director of his multi-club organization, Eagle Football.
In a development that has undoubtedly surprised the football finance sector, Eagle Football is gearing up for an initial public offering on the New York Stock Exchange.
Woodward, who assumed the role of executive vice chairman two years after the Glazers took Manchester United public to alleviate the club’s debt, possesses significant experience in managing a publicly traded company.
However, supporters of the clubs under Eagle’s ownership—Palace, Botafogo, Molenbeek, and Lyon—are likely to approach this news with caution, given the contentious nature of Woodward’s time at Old Trafford.